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This paper uses data from an actual fishery to construct a tractable and dynamic model to 
compare expected profit and its variance, optimal stock size, optimal harvest rate and 
optimal fishing effort under different management regimes under uncertainty. The 
results provide a comparison of instrument choice between a total harvest control and a 
total effort control under uncertainty, an original method to evaluate the tradeoffs 
between profits and other criteria in a dynamic context, and provide guidance as to the 
relative merits of catch and effort controls in fisheries management.  
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  1I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A major focus of fisheries economics is designing the appropriate set of instruments to 
achieve desired management objectives, such as sustainability and economic efficiency. 
An important consideration when choosing between alternatives is the uncertainty 
associated with total harvest or total allowable catch (TAC) controls, and the uncertainty 
associated with effort controls, denoted by total allowable effort (TAE). The principal 
causes of uncertainty are: unexpected realizations in terms of the stock size such that the 
TAC is set at too high or too low a level, and unexpected realizations in terms of the 
catch-effort relationship such that fishing effort is set at an inappropriate level.  
 
Uncertainty in stock size is often cited as one of the main limitations of TAC controls in 
fisheries. This is because some knowledge of stocks is required to be able to set a TAC 
that, in turn, also determines any quota allocations vessels may obtain under an 
individual transferable quota system. If the TAC is set too high because the stock is less 
than expected, fisheries managers run the risk of putting excessive fishing pressure on 
stocks in low abundance years, with the potential for substantial reductions in the total 
catch in the future. If the TAC is set at too low a level because fish stocks are greater 
than expected, managers reduce the profitable opportunities available to fishers.  
 
A similar problem exists in terms of effort controls except the uncertainty arises in the 
catch-effort relationship, usually denominated by the catch per unit of effort (CPUE). If 
the CPUE is higher than expected then a fishery manager risks setting a TAE that is too 
large and thus places at risk the sustainability of fish stocks, and also increases the per 
  2unit cost of fishing in future years. If the CPUE is less than expected then the TAE will 
be set at too low a level, this will also reduce the profitable opportunities available to 
fishers. In both cases (TAC or TAE controls) unexpected realizations in stock size or in 
the CPUE will result in errors and a failure to achieve management objectives.  
 
In this paper we examine the relative merits of TAC versus TAE controls using data 
from an actual fishery. Our work builds on the insights of Hannesson and Steinshamn 
(1991), Quiggin (1992) and Danielsson (2002 a,b). In earlier work, Hannesson and 
Steinshamn (1991) in a single-period model compared expected profits with a TAC and 
with a TAE and, under reasonable assumptions about the curvature of the revenue and 
cost functions, found that a TAC gives both higher expected revenues and also 
harvesting costs relative to a TAE when the only source of uncertainty is stock size. 
Quiggin (2002) used the same one-period model to show that, if stocks are independently 
and identically distributed, there exists a constant TAE control that yields a higher profit 
than a fixed TAC. Danielsson (2002a,b) added another type of uncertainty in terms of 
the CPUE, in addition to uncertainty with respect to stock size, so as to make a fairer 
comparison of the two instruments. He found that, all else equal, the greater the 
variability in the CPUE relative to the growth in the stock the greater is the comparative 
advantage of a TAC relative to a TAE.  
 
In this paper we use data from the Northern Prawn fishery (NPF) of Australia to 
compare the relative merits of TAC and TAE controls in the presence of uncertainty, in 
an explicit dynamic model. We do not consider the incentives issues of input versus 
  3output controls, nor do we examine differences in costs of management because these 
have been examined in detail elsewhere (Grafton et al. 2006). As far as we are aware, 
our analysis is the first to make dynamic comparisons between TAC and TAE controls 
under uncertainty using actual fisheries data. We also extend the results of Danielsson 
into a fully dynamic model that examines the effects on the variance of expected profits, 
fish stocks, the harvest rate and fishing effort. We also provide, for the first time, a 
practical method to compare TAC and TAE controls under uncertainty.  
 
Section 2 provides a brief description of the NPF. Section 3 sets out the theoretical 
framework, including the biological model, the relationship between harvest and catch 
per unit of effort, the economic model and the optimizing framework to compare TAC 
and TAE controls. We use a genetic algorithm in Section 4 to solve the model for a set 
of parameters and compare differences between expected profit, stock size, harvest rate 
and fishing effort under TAC and TAE controls. Section 5 provides additional scenarios 
to compare the two instruments while Section 6 concludes.  
 
II. THE AUSTRALIAN NORTHERN PRAWN FISHERY  
 
The NPF occupies a very large area of the ocean off Australia’s northern coast. The 
fishery extends from the low water mark to the outer edge of the Australian fishing zone 
(AFZ) along approximately 6,000 kilometres of coastline between Cape York in 
Queensland and Cape Londonderry in Western Australia (AFMA, 2002).  
 
  4There are more than fifty species of prawn that inhabit Australia’s tropical northern 
coastline, but only about nine species of prawns are harvested. Three species (the white 
banana prawn Fenneropenaeus merguiensis¸ the brown tiger prawn Penaeus esculentus, 
and the grooved tiger prawn P. semisulcatus) account for almost 80 per cent of the total 
annual landed catch weight from the fishery (AFMA, 2002).  The banana prawns are 
caught are different times of the year to the two main species of tiger prawns. When 
fishing for tiger prawns, vessels utilize twin-rigged otter trawl nets that sweep the ocean 
behind the fishing vessel. The netting at the mouth of the net is hung from a headrope at 
the top and a footrope stretched between otter boards. Operators can regulate the width 
of their net according to the angle and lateral force of the net otter boards (AFMA, 
1999). 
 
The fishery is managed under the Northern Prawn Fishery Management Plan 1995. To 
date, a series of input controls have been used to regulate the fishery. These controls 
include limited entry and gear restrictions (through the issuing of Statutory Fishing 
Rights or SFRs), a system of spatial and temporal closures, and by-catch restrictions 
(AFMA, 2002). The SFRs control fishing capacity by placing limits on the numbers of 
boats and the amount of gear permitted in the fishery. In its relatively short history the 
fishery has experienced a significant variation in catch. Low prawn prices reduced 
profitability in the 1980s and led to restructuring of the fleet in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The fleet structure has also changed gradually since the 1970s with a transition 
from wooden trawlers with brine tanks and iceboxes toward larger, purpose-built, steel 
freezer trawlers with high catch and carrying capacities. 
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III. BIOECONOMIC MODELS OF THE FISHERY 
 
To compare TAC and TAE controls under uncertainty we need a biological model of the 
stock recruitment relationship and a specification regarding the relationship between 
fishing effort and the total harvest. 
 
Stock-Recruitment Relationship 








− = +                                                      (1) 
 
where RBt
B is the total number of recruits produced in year t and  1 ˆ
t S −  is the spawning stock 
of the previous year (estimated as the number of prawns). The parameters αB1
B and βB1
B 
determine the relationship between recruitment and the number of spawners in the 
previous year while the term ξB1
B represents uncertainty, or the stochastic behavior of the 
spawning stock-recruitment relationship.  
 
The underlying relationships within the stock-recruitment relationship must also be 
modeled. First, the spawning stock is taken as a proportion (γ) of the total female stock, 
assuming that female prawns constitute half of the total stock of prawns and the sex ratio 
(males to females) is 1:1, i.e., 
( ) 11 ˆ /2 tt SS γ −− =                                                       (2).   7
 
Following Penn et al. (1995) and Wang and Die (1996) the spawning stock  ˆ
t S  is 
assumed to be the result of annual recruitment RBt
B and also fishing effort, defined as 
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where  FBt
B is fishing mortality at year t and m is the annual natural mortality rate.  Using 
existing studies from the NPF, Wang and Die (1996) define fishing mortality in year t as 
follows: 
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where q is the ‘catchability coefficient’ and EBt
B is fishing effort at year t.   
 
Fishing effort is determined as total ‘standard’ boat days in the fishery, which is a 
multiple of total ‘standard’ boats (BBt
B) and nominal fishing days in the season (NBt
B). In the 
NPF, one unit of fishing effort is defined as the daily effort of a ‘standard’ boat that 
equates boat day units between large and small vessels.  In practical terms, this capacity 
can be measured by boat engine power and a measure of hull units, or the length or the 
weight of boat. For example, in the NPF boat size is measured in terms of A-units, as a 
simple linear combination of a kilowatt of engine power and a cubic meter of hull. Thus 
if we define a standard boat size as  A units then the total standard boat numbers at year t 
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where M is the number of boats in the fishery and ABi
B the size of boat i in units in year t. If 
there is technological change then (4) needs to be adjusted such that  
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where TECBt
B measures the change in technology at year t.   
 
Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) 
To assess the effect of uncertainty on CPUE, we must also specify a relationship 
between harvest or total catch and the biology of the fishery. Based on previous work on 
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where hBt
B is the annual catch in tonnes that increases asymptotically to a maximum of 
3 t R α  as fishing effort tends to infinity (Wang and Die, 1996).   
 
Using (7) CPUE at a given point in time is: 
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where ξB2 
Brepresents stochastic behavior associated with CPUE.  
 
Economic Model 
To operationalize the bioeconomic model, further specifications are required in terms of 
total revenue and total costs. Annual total revenue of the fishery  is defined as the 
multiple of annual fish harvest and the annual (average) price of fish,   
 
th t TR p h =                                                            (9) 
where pBh
B is the price of fish drawn from an inverse demand curve. Following Danielsson 
(2002a) and Campbell, et al., (1993) this price is determined using the following 
specification with data from the period 1990-2003 (ABARE, 1990-2003), 
 
1/
00 (/ ) ht pp H h
ε =                                                  (10) 
 
where ε is the elasticity of demand for catch and pB0
B is the unit price of the catch when the 
volume of the catch is HB0
B.   
 
Annual total cost of the fleet is assumed to be the sum of labor, material, capital and 
other costs. Labor costs are represented as a share of total revenue because of the share 
system for the remuneration crew that also accounts for material costs such as packaging   10
and gear maintenance expenditures. Capital costs, defined as the sum of depreciation and 
the annual opportunity cost of boat capital value, and other costs (of which fuel is a 
major component) are assumed to depend on fishing effort that is defined as total 
‘standard’ boat-days with the number of ‘standard’ boats (BBt
B) computed as per equation 
(5). Thus that total harvesting costs are expressed as  
 




B are the share cost of labor and materials per each Australian dollar of 
output, cBK
B and cBO
B are, respectively, the average capital and other costs per unit of effort, 
and  F c  is a fixed cost component. The average capital cost of a unit of effort (cBK
B) is 
estimated by dividing total capital costs by total effort. Average other costs (cBO
B) per unit 
of effort are estimated by dividing total other costs by total fishing effort.   
 
Using (10) and (11) the annual fishery profit is as  
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Optimization Model 
The stated aim of the Australian government is to maximize economic efficiency in its 
fisheries subject to a long-term sustainability constraint. Consequently, we specify that 
the management objective is to maximise expected profits over time. The control 
variable in the case of TAE control is fishing effort ( t E ), defined as the number of   11
nominal days fished, while with a TAC the control is exercised via the total harvest ( t h ). 
Thus with a TAE, assuming fishing effort is observable and also enforceable the problem 
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If future profits are discounted and if (6), (7) and (1) are substituted into equation (13) 
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where δ  is the discount rate and  t Π
)
 is the net present value of profit at year t.    
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subject to equations (1)-(3).   Solving (14) or (15) also requires that spawning stock at 
the period 0 ( 0 ˆ S ) be known and an appropriate transversality condition which we specify 
as 0 T Π= 
Model Parameters    
To make the comparisons between TAC and TAE controls under uncertainty we need to 
specify parameter values for (14) and (15). Many of these values are in terms of the 
stock-recruitment model given in (1) and fishing mortality in (6). The parameters for the 
two main types of prawns (brown tiger and grooved tiger prawns) caught in the fishery 
are provided in Table One. Further details on the sources and calculations used to derive 
the parameters are provided in Kompas and Che (2003). 
 
In addition to using parameter values from other studies, the stock-recruitment equation, 
given by equation (1) and the CPUE, given by equation (8), were estimated using annual 
time-series database over the period 1971-2000. Initial values are drawn from measures 
in Wang and Die (1996). Both equations were estimated using Non-Linear Least Squares 
(NLS) estimation techniques in Microfit 5.1. The estimating equation for the stock 
recruitment relationship is 
 
11 ˆ
11 3 ˆ (, )
t S
tt t RS e u u
β α ξ
−
− =+                                              (16) 
 
where uBt
B is the residual of the regression with mean value u  and standard deviation ξB3
B.  
The estimating equation for the CPUE relationship is as follows:   13
 
3()





CPUE R e E u u
E
β α ξ
−+ == − +                          (17) 
 
where uBt
B is the residual of the regression with the mean value u  and standard deviation 
ξB4
B. The estimated results for the two equations are provided in Table Two where the 
standard deviation has been converted to a percentage deviation. 
 
The estimated parameters and standard deviations of the regression equations for (16) 
and (17) are provided in Table Two. The results both support the previous biological 
studies and also the application of the CPUE equation given by (8). Table Two also 
shows that the variance in the stock-recruitment relationship is smaller in all cases than 
that for CPUE.  
 
IV. RESULTS OF THE BIOECONOMIC MODELS  
 
Given the nonlinear relationships in the bioeconomic models and stochastic nature of the 
problem a genetic algorithm (Goldberg 1989) imported into MAPLE 10.0 was used to 
solve for the optimal solution to the TAE control problem in (14) and the TAC control 
problem in (15). The optimal solutions for a non-stochastic ( 34 0 ξ ξ = = ) version of the 
model and also a stochastic version using the estimated standard deviations in Table 
Two are presented in Table Three. In both cases the discount rate is set equal to zero and the time horizon is 50 years, long enough to guarantee that optimal results are 
sufficiently close to their steady state values before diverting to meet a terminal 
condition in year 50. The terminal condition is such that the value of profits at year 50 
goes to zero. As a result near the terminal state or year 50, effort and harvest increase 
and stock size falls dramatically as the terminal condition of zero profits is met.  
The base model in Table Three shows that, in the absence of uncertainty and with perfect 
information and enforcement, the TAC and TAE controls yield identical results. By 
contrast, using the estimated measures of uncertainty in the fishery there is a difference 
between the two instruments, as shown in the stochastic recruitment and CPUE model in 
the lower half of Table Three. Given that the estimated standard deviation in the stock 
recruitment relationship is lower than in the CPUE relationship a TAC control 
outperforms a TAE control in terms of expected profits by about A$13 million for the 
fishery as a whole, or approximately A$2,200 per boat per year. In addition, the standard 
deviation in mean expected profit is less than a third with a TAC versus a TAE control 
while the stock size with a TAC is also higher than with a TAE, and also has a lower 
standard deviation. 
 
The optimal solutions for the case with a social-economic discount rate of three per cent 
are reported in Table 4. Both cases (without and with uncertainty) indicate more catch 
earlier in the planning horizon and consequently smaller ‘near’ steady state stocks than 
in cases without discounting. With discounting, future catch is valued less today 
generating a preference for increases in catch in transition than in the steady state. 
Harvest and fishing effort per boat per year in the base case are thus higher for the 
  14discounted case being some 2,350 tonnes and 77 days while they are 2,240 tonnes and 
70 days without discounting. To maintain catch at higher levels the stock must be 
smaller, indicating that discounting is less ‘conservationist’ than the case of no 
discounting. As with the case of a zero discount rate, a TAC is preferred to TAE control 
because it generates a higher mean expected profit, a much lower standard deviation of 
mean expected profits, a higher stock size and lower fishing effort in terms of total boat 
days.  
 
V.  UNCERTAINTY SCENARIOS AND INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
 
To further analyze the effects of estimated uncertainties on instrument choice we 
generate three counterfactual scenarios. In case one, we use the estimated standard 
deviation in the stock recruitment relationship provided in Table Two, but set the 
standard deviation in the CPUE relationship equal to zero. In the second scenario, we set 
the standard deviation in the stock recruitment relationship equal to zero but use the 
estimated standard deviation in the CPUE relationship from Table Two. In the third 
case, we assign the estimated standard deviation of the CPUE relationship in Table Two 
to the stock-recruitment relationship, and assign the estimated standard deviation of the 
stock recruitment relationship in Table Two to the CPUE relationship. 
 
The optimal solutions for the three cases are provided in Table 5 without discounting. In 
case one, both TAC and TAE controls generate higher expected profits than with the 
actual uncertainty in the fishery. As we would expect, given there is no uncertainty in the 
  15  16
CPUE relationship ( 4 0 ξ = ), the TAE control is preferred over the TAC control in terms 
of expected mean profits. In this case, the TAE control generates a higher profit of 
around A$ 1,500 per boat per year (nominal value). However, even in this extreme 
scenario the TAC control still manages to generate a lower variation in expected profits 
and a higher stock size than a TAE control.  
 
In case two, there is no stochasticity in the stock recruitment relationship ( 3 0 ξ = ) but the 
estimated standard deviation for the CPUE relationship of 25.23 per cent and 23.25 per 
cent for Brown and Grooved prawns is retained. In this scenario, the TAC control 
provides a higher expected mean profit of about $3,800 per boat per year (nominal 
value) compared to TAE control, a lower optimal stock size at the steady state and also 
smaller variance for expected profits than TAE control. 
 
In case three, the stochastic levels of stock and CPUE are swapped such that the standard 
deviation of the stock recruitment relationship is higher than the standard deviation of 
the CPUE relationship ( 34 ξ ξ > ). In this scenario, unlike the results reported in Table 
Three, the TAE control generates a higher expected mean profit compared to a TAC 
control. However, the standard deviation of expected profits is almost as twice as large 
with the TAE control and the stock size is slightly smaller. Thus it is not clear, given risk 
averse fishers, whether a TAE would be the preferred instrument despite the fact it 
generates higher expected total profits. 
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A summary of the effects of TAC and TAE controls under the three uncertainty 
scenarios, the base case with no uncertainty, and also with the actual estimated 
uncertainties in the stock recruitment and CPUE relationship is provided in Table Six.  
Our results are consistent with the Danielsson (2002b) one-period model in that we show 
that if the standard variation is greater (less than) in the stock recruitment relationship 
relative to the CPUE relationship then the mean expected profits at the optimum solution 
are lower (higher) with TAC versus TAE controls. However we also show, for the first 
time, that there are important differences in terms of variation in profits, stock size, 
harvest rate and level of fishing effort between TAC and TAE controls under 
uncertainty. At least for the estimated stock recruitment and CPUE relationships that 
exist in the NPF, we find that even when the TAE control is preferred on the basis of 
expected profits when  34 ξ ξ > , the standard deviation of expected profits is still much 
less with a TAC control while the stock size is higher, and both the harvest rate and level 
of fishing effort are less. Thus if fishers are risk averse and/or if fishery managers attach 
a greater value to stock sizes because of resilience to environmental shocks (Grafton, 
Kompas and Lindenmayer 2005) a TAC control may still be preferred to a TAE control 
even if total expected profits are higher. 
 
Overall, the results show important differences between the two instruments with 
uncertainty, and that even in the case when a TAE generates a higher expected mean 
profit it not clear that it would necessarily be preferred over a TAC control. The relative 
merits of TAC control are further highlighted if we consider the possibility of ‘effort 
creep’ where the regulator is not able to effectively control fishing effort because of the incentives of fishers to substitute to unregulated fishing inputs. For instance, in an earlier 
study Kompas, Che and Grafton (2004) have shown that such input substitution in the 
NPF has resulted in lower technical efficiency and higher than optimal levels of fishing 
effort.   
  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
In this paper we provide the first dynamic comparison of instrument choice in fishing 
between a total harvest control and a total effort control under uncertainty. Using data 
from the Northern prawn Fishery of Australia we provide a methodology to compare the 
two instruments. In a fifty-year planning period, various scenarios are examined to 
compare optimal outcomes with a total harvest and total effort controlled fishery where 
the uncertainty is estimated from known stock-recruitment relationships and catch and 
effort data.  
 
A base case scenario with no uncertainty shows that the two instruments — total harvest 
or total effort — give identical outcomes provided there is perfect monitoring and 
enforcement. Using the estimated uncertainties in the stock recruitment and catch per 
unit of effort relationships we find that a total harvest control, with and without 
discounting, is preferred in that it generates a higher total profit, lower variance of 
expected profits, higher stock size, and lower harvest rate and levels of fishing effort 
compared to a total effort control. This is because there is greater variation in the 
estimated catch per unit of effort relationship than in the stock recruitment relationship.  
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Using different specifications regarding the uncertainties, three counterfactual scenarios 
are analyzed. These scenarios show that, for the Northern Prawn Fishery, even when 
TAE generates a higher total expected profit it has a higher variance in expected profits, 
a smaller optimal stock size, and higher optimal harvest rate and fishing effort than a 
TAC control. Overall, we provide a tractable method to compare management 
instruments in actual fisheries under uncertainty, show the nature of the tradeoffs 
between profits and other management criteria in a dynamic context, and give guidance 
on the relative merits of TAC and TAE controls.  
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Table One:  Parameter Values Used in the Optimization Models  
Parameters   Source  Units   Parameter Values 
     Brown Tiger   Grooved Tiger 
Biological model      
0 ˆ S   CSIRO (2002a)  million prawns  15   18 
RB1
B   million  prawns    187 309 
αB1
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  14.41 45.96 
βB1
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  0.0096 0.0548 
αB2
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  0.111 0.047 
βB2
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  0.354 0.302 
m Wang  (1999), 
Wang & Die 
(1996) 
annual rate   0.045 0.045 
γ  Crocos (1987a, 
1987b) 
annual rate   0.3 0.2 
      
Fishing model      
αB3
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  14.08 15.18 
βB3
B  Wang & Die 
(1996) 
  0.494 0.544 
     Brown and Grooved Tiger Prawn 
Number of vessels   AFMA (2002)  number                    120 
Standard A-unit vessel   CSIRO (2002b)  A-unit                    400 
Catchability rate of one unit 
fishing effort  
Wang (1999)  CPUE(kg/day)                   8.8*(10^-5) 
     
Economic model     
The initial price (PB0
B)  ABARE (2003)  $/kg                  30 
The initial catch (HB0
B)  ABARE (2003)  ton                   1,800 
Price elasticity of demand     Authors’ 
calculations 
                  15 




                 0.26 




                 0.25 
Average capital cost per a 




$ per ’standard’ 
boat- day 
               884 
Average other costs per unit 




$ per ’standard’ 
boat- day 
              1,180 
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Table Two:  Non-Linear Estimated Results for the Ricker Equation (16) and the 
CPUE Equation (17) Using 1971-2000 Data 
Ricker Equation Brown  Tiger Grooved  Tiger  
Coefficient αB1
B    
Estimate 14.41  45.96 
t-ratio   6.09   9.26 
p-value 0.000  0.000 
Coefficient βB1
B    
Estimate 0.0096  0.0548 
t-ratio   3.16   4.16 
p-value 0.004  0.000 
Standard deviation of the   21.45 %  15.92% 
residuals of the regression (ξB3
B)    
   
CPUE Equation Brown  Tiger Grooved Tiger 
Coefficient αB3
B   1
  Estimate  14.03 15.18 
  t-ratio  2.91 1.94 
  p-value  0.007 0.063 
Coefficient βB3
B    
  Estimate  0.494 0.544 
  t-ratio  3.04 1.5 
  p-value  0.005 0.147 
    
Standard deviation of the 25.53% 23.155% 
residuals of the regression  (ξB4
B)    
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Table Three:  Optimal Solutions of the Base-Case and Stochastic Models without 
Discounting  
   Unit TAC control  TAE control 
        
1  Base model       
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  732,000,000 732,000,000 
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size     308 308 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  205 205 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  millions  103 103 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,240 2,240 
  Number of boats in a year  boat  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year  days  70 70 
  Total boat days per year   boat-day  8,400 8,400 
        
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size     304 304 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  198 198 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  millions  106 106 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,140 2,140 
  Number of boats   boat  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year  days  67 67 
  Total boat days   boat-day  8,040 8,040 
        
2  Stochastic recruitment and CPUE       
  model       
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  658,000,000 645,000,000 
  •  Standard of deviation   millions     40,000,000  152,000,000 
       
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size   millions  330 324 
  •  Stock size of Tiger Brown   millions  227 219 
  •  Stock size of Tiger Grooved   tonnes  106 105 
  Annual harvest   tonnes   2,060 2,100 
  Number of boats in a year  boat-day  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year   days  61 63 
  Total boat days per year at the steady state  boat-days  7,320 7,560 
        
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size   millions  321 317 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  213 211 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  tonnes  108 106 
  Annual harvest   tonnes   1,950 2,070 
  Number of boats   boat-day  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year  days  58 62 
  Total boat days   boat-days  6,960 7,440 
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Table Four: Optimal Solutions of the Base-case and Stochastic Models with a Discount 
Rate (δ  = 3 %) 
    Unit  TAC control  TAE control 
        
1  Base model       
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  365,000,000 365,000,000 
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size     302 302 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  203 203 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  millions  99 99 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,350 2,350 
  Number of boats in a year  boat  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year   days  77 77 
  Total boat days per year   boat-day  9,240 9,240 
        
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size     298 298 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  196 196 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  millions  102 102 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,250 2,250 
  Number of boats   boat  120 120 
  Fishing day   days  73 73 
  Total boat days   boat-day  8,760 8,760 
        
2  Stochastic recruitment and CPUE       
  model       
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  328,000,000 326,000,000 
  •  Standard of deviation   millions  21,000,000 79,000,000 
       
  Mean values at steady state      
  Average stock size   millions  329 322 
  •  Stock size of Tiger Brown   millions  223 217 
  •  Stock size of Tiger Grooved   tonnes  106 105 
  Annual harvest   tonnes   2,080 2,120 
  Number of boats in a year  boat-day  120 120 
  Fishing day per boat per year    days  63 64 
  Total boat days per year at the steady state  boat-days  7,560 7,680 
        
  Average values per year      
  Total stock size   millions  320 315 
  •  Stock size of Brown Tiger  millions  216 208 
  •  Stock size of Grooved Tiger  tonnes  104 105 
  Annual harvest   tonnes   2,020 2,060 
  Number of boats   boat-day  120 120 
  Fishing day   days  61 63 
  Total boat days   boat-days  7,320 7,560 
        
 Table Five:  Optimal solutions Under Three Uncertainty Scenarios 
    Unit  TAC control  TAE control 
  Case One      
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  661,000,000 670,000,000 
  Standard Deviation of Expected Profits      31,000,000     46,000,000 
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size   millions  327 316 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,070 2,160 
  Number of boats in a year  boat  120 120 
  Fishing day in a year   days  62 67 
  Total boat days per year   boat-day  7,440 8,040 
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size     321 313 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  1,970 2,100 
  Number of boats   boat  120 120 
  Fishing day   days  59 64 
  Total boat days   boat-day  7,080 7,680 
        
  Case Two      
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  728,000,000 705,000,000 
  Standard Deviation of Expected Profits      22,000,000  145,000,000 
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size   millions  312 315 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,200 2,100 
  Number of boats in a year  boat  120 120 
  Fishing day in a year   days  69 64 
  Total boat days per year   boat-day  8,280 7,780 
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size     305 309 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,140 2,060 
  Number of boats   boat  120 120 
  Fishing day   days  67 63 
  Total boat days   boat-day  8,040 7,560 
 Case  Three      
  Total Expected Profit (mean value)  A$  603,000,000 615,000,000 
  Standard Deviation of Expected Profits    55,000,000 119,000,000 
  Mean values at steady state      
  Total stock size   millions  331 321 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  2,000 2,180 
  Number of boats in a year  boat  120 120 
  Fishing day in a year   days  58 67 
  Total boat days per year   boat-day  6,960 8,040 
  The average values per year      
  Total stock size     323 319 
  Annual harvest   tonnes  1,900 2,000 
  Number of boats   boat  120 120 
  Fishing day   days  56 61 
  Total boat days   boat-day  6,720 7,320 
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Table Six:  Summary of Profit, Stock, Harvest and Fishing Effort Impacts of TAC 
and TAE Controls Under Different Scenarios 
Scenario Total 
Expected 
Profit  (Π) 
St. Dev. 
Expected 
Profit (σ ) 
Effects of management options at steady state 
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